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VI

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee ("Lefavi") does not dispute Appellants' ("Bertoch and Poulson") Statement
of Jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
For each of their stated issues on appeal, Bertoch and Poulson failed to provide either:
(1) applicable standards of review; or (2) a citation to the record showing that each issue was
preserved in the trial court below, each of which is required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). For
the benefit of the Court, Lefavi hereby states the applicable standards of review:
1.

Issue: Was the trial court correct in awarding prejudgment interest on the basis

of its finding that damages had been fixed with reasonable certainty?
Standard of review: Correctness. A trial court's decision on entitlement to
prejudgment interest presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
Bailev-Allen Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah App. 1994).
2.

Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not correcting an expert's

purported mathematical error in determining the parties' respective proportionate shares in
the property at issue?

1

Standard of review: Abuse of discretion; clearly erroneous. Atrial court's
actions regarding the parties' property interests are entitled to a presumption of validity, and
its valuation of respective property interests will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah App. 1995) (allegation of expert
mathematical error in valuation of marital property). Because a valuation determination
necessarily rests on findings of fact, an appellant challenging a trial court's findings of fact
on appeal carries the burden of marshaling the evidence, which requires him to marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence,
thus making them clearly erroneous, Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d305,312(Utah 1997)
(emphasis added).
3.

Issue: Did the trial court deviate from or misapply the parties' stipulated

damages amounts?
Standard of review: Clearly erroneous. Application of the parties' stipulated
damages were dependent first upon the trial court reaching certain findings of fact as to
whether such amounts should even be recognized and included in the damage calculation.
If so found by the trial court, then such applicable stipulated amounts would be included in

2

the court's damage calculation. Therefore, application of the parties' stipulated damages
rested on the trial court's factual findings that such applicable figures were "accurate"
(Finding of Fact No. 35; trial court's Findings of Fact attached to Appellants' Brief as
Appendix "C") as well as "accurately portraying the applicable dollar amounts for the Court
to consider in its ruling" (Finding of Fact No. 53). An appellant challenging a trial court's
findings of fact on appeal carries the burden of marshaling the evidence, which requires him
to marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight
of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d at
312 (emphasis added).
4.

Issue: Whether the trial court acted inconsistently in excluding certain costs

when valuing Lefavi's share in the project?
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion; clearly erroneous. A trial court's
actions regarding the parties' property interests are entitled to a presumption of validity, and
its valuation of respective property interests will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Breinholt 905 P.2d at 882. Because a valuation determination necessarily rests
on a finding of fact, an appellant challenging a trial court's findings of fact on appeal carries
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the burden of marshaling the evidence, which requires him to marshal the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus
making them clearly erroneous. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312 (emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Lefavi does not dispute Section A ("Nature of the Case") of Bertoch and Poulson's
Statement of Case. Lefavi does not dispute the general procedural history given in Section
B ("Course of Proceedings") of Bertoch and Poulson's Statement of Case, but disputes that
Section's conclusory allegation that the trial court's "findings and conclusions are incorrect
in some instances and in others are against the great weight of evidence proffered at trial."
Lefavi responds to each of numbered paragraphs of Section C ("Summary of Relevant
Facts") of Bertoch and Poulson's Statement of Case, and objects to such facts as noted
below:
OBJECTIONS TO APPELLANT'S SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found, based on the evidence presented

to it, that Bertoch and Poulson acquired the interest in the Las Vegas Properties around the
middle of 1975 (See Finding of Fact No. 2.) The trial court then found that as of February,

4

1976, Bertoch and Poulson held their interest in the Las Vegas Properties under an
unregistered partnership name known as Richards Street Development Company. (See
Finding of Fact No. 3). With the exception of certain testimony of Bertoch, no evidence was
presented to the trial court to suggest that prior to February, 1976 this partnership held any
interest in the Las Vegas Properties. Although Bertoch offered testimony claiming that he
and Poulson initially owned the Las Vegas Properties with three other equal partners, Lefavi
disputed such testimony and offered evidence contradicting or at variance with Bertoch's
claims. Such evidence is detailed in the Argument Section below. Upon weighing such
evidence, the trial court found Bertoch's testimony unpersuasive in light of the other
evidence presented to it, and, as the trier-of-fact, the court held that it would not include such
claims in its calculations for determining Lefavi's pro rata share of the project with Bertoch
and Poulson. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 51 and 52.)
2.

The trial court's Findings of Fact did not make any determination as to what

Richards Street's investment objective was in the Las Vegas Properties. It is unclear what
relevance such an investment purpose has to this appeal. The only fact set forth in Bertoch
and Poulson's Paragraph 2 which the trier-of-fact did determine was that the Las Vegas

5

Properties were eventually offered for sale and subsequently sold. (See Findings of Facts
Nos. 19, 28 and 30.)
3.

The trial court made a specific finding against the allegation and claim by

Bertoch and Poulson regarding their purchase of other partners' interests and the payment
of commissions. During trial, Bertoch and Poulson spent considerable time attempting to
present evidence and testimony to support such claims. Lefavi presented to the trial court
testimony and evidence contradicting and disputing these claims. The trial court, after
weighing all of the evidence presented to it, found Bertoch and Poulson's testimony and
evidence unpersuasive. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 51 and 52.)
4.

No objection.

5.

This alleged relevant fact misconstrues and misstates the trial court's specific

Findings of Fact. In its Findings of Fact, the trial court stated that during the July 19, 1978
meeting, Bertoch represented to Lefavi that Lefavi would be acquiring an interest in Bertoch
and Poulson's joint interest in the Las Vegas Properties. (See Finding of Fact No. 7;
emphasis added.) The trial court's Findings deny Bertoch and Poulson's claim that in April,
1978 Lefavi's interest in the Las Vegas Properties was changed to a right to participate in a
share of profits. The trial court held that the parties had agreed that "Lefavi's investment
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agreement would be changed to a proportional share basis" and that Lefavi's proportional
interest "was to be determined as follows: total proceeds [from the sale of the properties less
costs and expenses] divided among [the parties] in proportion to the total monies each had
actually contributed." (See Findings ofFactNos. 12 and 13.)
6.

No objection.

7.

The trial court made no finding along the lines claimed in Bertoch and

Poulson's Paragraph 7. To the contrary, the trial court held that after the 1983 sale, "neither
Bertoch nor Poulson invested any more of their own monies." The trial court also found that
from the 1983 sale to 1988, portions of the Las Vegas Properties were leased and thereby
"generated income which was used to pay joint venture expenses." (See Findings of Fact
Nos. 24 and 25.)
8.

Bertoch and Poulson's Paragraph 8 contradicts specific Findings made by the

trial court, which weighed all the evidence presented regarding the $32,182.00 payment by
Bertoch to Lefavi in August, 1983. After weighing all of the evidence regarding such alleged
payment, the trial court specifically held that no monies were paid by Bertoch and Poulson
to Lefavi from the 1983 sale of the Las Vegas Properties. (See Finding of Fact Nos. 22 and
56.) The trial court also stated in its Findings of Fact "[t]here was insufficient credible or
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admissible evidence presented during the course of the trial which would support Bertoch
and Poulson's claims that the following items relate to and reduce or affect the proceeds due
Lefavi from his investment in the Las Vegas Properties . . . a payment to Lefavi of
$32,182.00." (See Finding of FactNos. 51 and 52.)
9.

The only objection to Bertoch and Poulson's Paragraph 9 appears to be a

typographical error in their Brief misstating that Bertoch and Poulson paid Lefavi $68,875.00
to purchase Lefavi's interest. To the contrary, Lefavi paid Bertoch and Poulson $68,875.00
to purchase an interest in the Las Vegas Properties.
10.

Bertoch and Poulson's Paragraph 10 misstates Lefavi's pro rata share, which

should be of "the proceeds" and not of "the profit" derived from the sales of the Las Vegas
Properties. In addition, Lefavi objects to the characterization in Paragraph 10 that the records
were inadequate to provide a fair and reasonable accounting. Although the records may have
been inadequate to provide "a complete accounting," Lefavi asserts and the trial court
proceeded on the basis that the records were sufficient for both parties' accounting experts
to reach an agreement as to the specific amounts that would be due and owing under
whichever factual scenario the trial court found the evidence compelling. (See Trial Exhibit
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140, attached to Appellants' Brief as Appendix "D" and referred to herein as "the
Stipulation"; Findings of Fact Nos. 34 and 35.)
11.

Bertoch and Poulson assert that the Stipulation by the parties resolved

accounting issues, but did not necessarily disputed factual issues. Regardless, stipulated facts
at trial cannot be then subsequently disputed on appeal. This argument will be made further
in this brief below.
12.

In the Stipulation, the parties stipulated to specific dollar values which the trial

court could apply to its damages calculation after it had rendered its decision on various
disputed issues of fact. The Stipulation did not resolve disputed claims between the parties
as to which of the stipulated amounts would be used by the trial court in its determination of
damages. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 35, 51-53.)
13.

Lefavi strongly disputes Paragraph 13's representation that no testimony or

other evidence disputed Bertoch and Poulson's claims. To the contrary, the trial court had
before it and considered a great deal of evidence which contradicted Bertoch and Poulson's
claims that they had paid any monies to buy out three alleged partners in the Las Vegas
Properties, which evidence is referenced in the Argument Section of this Brief. Although the
parties may have stipulated as to the specific dollar impact on the trial court's damage
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calculation, if the court were to find sufficient evidence to hold that Bertoch and Poulson had
bought out certain partners in the Richards Street Development Company, by no means did
Lefavi stipulate to the actual occurrence of such a buy out. To the contrary, it was made
perfectly clear to the trial court that the Stipulation did not alleviate the trial court of its
responsibility to determine whether such events occurred. The Stipulation was only intended
to assist the trial court in understanding the specific mathematically calculable impact on
damages that a certain contingent event would have, if the trial court held that the evidence
established that such an event occurred. (See Record at 1590, pp. 600-14.) The trial court
in its Findings of Fact specifically stated that it found insufficient and inadmissible evidence
to support the claims that Bertoch and Poulson bought out prior partners in the Richard Street
Development Company. (See Finding of Fact Nos. 51 and 52).
14.

Although Lefavi did assert his Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to

specific questions relating to monies received by Lefavi in connection with certain stock
transactions, there was a substantial amount of evidence presented to the trial court which
directly contradicted Bertoch's claims that such stock transactions related to and were used
to pay off Bertoch and Poulson's obligations to Lefavi on the Las Vegas Properties
investment. (See Argument Section below.)

10

15.

The trial court weighed all of the evidence presented and found that Bertoch's

testimony with regard to the matters alleged in Paragraph 15 were directly disputed and
contradicted by Bertoch's inconsistent recollections and by documents created by Bertoch
at the time such transactions allegedly occurred.

Such evidence is detailed below.

Consequently, the trial court found against Bertoch and Poulson on these claims. (See
Findings of FactNos. 51 and 52.)
16.

No objection.

17.

No objection.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

In addition to the objections made above in reference to Bertoch and Poulson's
selective and sometimes misstated recitation of relevant facts, Lefavi refers this Court to the
following numbered paragraphs of the trial court's Findings of Fact as being further relevant
to consideration of the issues on appeal: Findings of Facts Nos. 2, 3, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 22, 23,
24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 43, 46, 51, 52, 53, and 56.

11

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's award of pre-judgment interest is proper because Lefavi's claims
were based on a contract action wherein the damages were calculated with mathematical
certainty, fixed as to a particular time, determined by fixed standards of values, and which
compensated Lefavi for monies intentionally and fraudulently withheld by Bertoch and
Poulson, who otherwise would have been unjustly enriched by their fraudulent actions.
Prejudgment interest is not precluded where the trier-of-fact exercises its judgment or
conscience in determining the existence of the underlying liability, but not in determining the
amount of the underlying liability.
In their assertions on appeal that the trial court refused to correct mathematical, legal
and factual errors, Bertoch and Poulson are simply challenging factual findings made by the
court. Bertoch and Poulson failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting the challenged
findings and have failed to demonstrate that the findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous. Lefavi presented credible
evidence disputing Bertoch and Poulson's claims. The trial court carefully weighed all the
evidence presented to it ,and found against Bertoch and Poulson. Bertoch and Poulson are
now rearguing the merits of their case before the Court of Appeals.

12

ARGUMENT
I.

DAMAGES WERE FIXED WITH MATHEMATICAL CERTAINTY, AND
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS THEREBY PROPERLY AWARDED.
A.

Utah Law on Prejudgment Interest.

Prejudgment interest is awarded in an attempt to return a prevailing party to the status
quo by fully compensating him for actual loss. James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah App. 1994). It compensates a party for the depreciating
value or opportunity cost of amounts owed him, and deters defendants from intentionally
withholding amounts due and owing, thereby preventing unjust enrichment. Trail Mountain
Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Utah 1996);
Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated guidelines for when prejudgment interest
should be allowed:
[Wjhere the damage is complete and the amount of loss fixed as of a
particular time, and that loss can by measured by facts and figures, interest
should be allowed from that time and not from the date ofjudgment. On the
other hand, where damages are incomplete and cannot be calculated with
mathematical accuracy, such as in case of personal injury, wrongful death,
defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damage
must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact at the trial, and in such
cases prejudgment interest is not allowed.
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Biork v. April Indus.. Inc.. 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added). This Court
has stated the test for prejudgment interest in the following terms:
In Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damage
is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of
loss is fixed as of a particular time.
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993). In other words,
the test for the availability of prejudgment interest seems to involve two basic elements: (1)
loss fixed at a particular time; and (2) loss ascertainable with mathematical accuracy.
Further, "mathematical accuracy" has been defined as follows:
[Mathematically accurate damages must be ascertained] in accordance with
fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value, which the court or jury
must follow in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by their best judgment
in assessing the amount to be allowed for past as well as for future injury, or
for elements that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of value.
Fell v. Union Pac. Rv. Co.. 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 1907). The Fell Court also noted that
prejudgment interest should be disallowed where damage calculations are "peculiarly within
the province of the jury to assess at the time of trial." 88 P. at 1007. See also Shoreline
Development. Inc. v. Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992) (no prejudgment
interest where jury must determine loss by its best judgment rather than fixed standards of
valuation); James Constructors. 888 P.2d at 671 (no prejudgment interest where "damages
are uncertain or speculative untilfixedby the factfinder"); Bailey-Allen Co.. 876 P.2d at 427
14

(no prejudgment interest "in cases of equitable relief that address themselves to the
conscience and discretion of the trial court").
1.

Damages Susceptible to Mathematical Accuracy.

A sum is mathematically accurate where it is arrived at by application of fixed
objective principles—accounting or otherwise—to fact. This is the case in contract actions,
such as in actions litigating the underpayment or overpayment of contractually due sums.
Where a sum is ascertainable with mathematical accuracy, a factfinder does not exercise his
judgment or conscience in determining the amount of liability. He only exercises his
judgment as to the existence of the underlying liability. The two types ofjudgment should
not be confused. Judgment as to underlying liability that can otherwise be calculated with
mathematical accuracy is not the same as an exercise of discretion as to the propriety of the
mathematically ascertainable amount. Indeed, in such situations, once a factfinder has made
a determination of underlying liability for such amounts, he is bound to accept the
mathematically accurate figures assigned to such amounts byfixedstandards of evidence and
known standards of value. In such situations, the damages calculation is not a product of the
factfinder's own discretion or conscience, but is the result of the objective application of
operative principles to the facts.

15

2.

Damages Not Susceptible to Mathematical Accuracy.

The above type of situation is to be distinguished from those where a factfinder must
necessarily use his best judgment or discretion in fixing a dollar amount to an injury not
otherwise quantifiable by strictly objective means. Such injuries can be personal in nature
(such as personal injury, debilitation, or death),1 inchoate in nature (such as defamation and
emotional distress),2 or speculative in nature (future lost profits).3 In any instance, such
injuries are unquantifiable and generally irreparable in nature, and as such, are not
objectively or accurately measured by precise dollar figures. At best, any dollar figure
assigned to such injuries is necessarily a rough approximation or substitute for truly
1

Bjork, 560 P.2d 315 (identifies "personal injury" and "wrongful death" as
instances of damages that are incomplete and cannot be calculated with mathematical
certainty).
2

IdL (identifies "defamation of character" and "false imprisonment" as instances
of damages that are incomplete and cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty).
3

Canyon Country Store, 781 P.2d 414(claim for projected lost profits where
claimant had no track record of past profits); Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Graystone
Pines Homeowners' Assoc, 789 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990) (claim for attorneys fees based
on quantum merit theory); Price-Orem Inv. Co., 784 P.2d 475 (claim for projected lost
profits based on economic assumptions than past rental history).

16

adequate, but unavailable, compensation (such as a new, fully functional limb or new,
unsullied reputation).
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed this general characterization when listing those
types of harm whose damages cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty, which
included "personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc."
Bjork, 560 P.2d at 317. Each of the named examples involves a type of harm to which
precise dollar-based damages cannot be objectively assigned, and which therefore require the
factfinder's exercise of discretion, judgment, and conscience as to the amount of liability,
which is separate and apart from the underlying issue of the existence of liability. Of note
is the fact that none of the examples identified by the Bjork Court involve contractual or
accounting scenarios. This is because such scenarios require only a determination of
underlying liability, and not one regarding the amount of liability, since such determinations
are made by the application of mathematically accurate principles to fact.4
4

Another useful way to differentiate the two different types of damages is to ask
whether a particular type of damages lends itself to only one "right" figure at any given point
in time. Damages for personal injury, inchoate harm or future lost profits may be susceptible
of multiple valuations at the same point in time, with all of those valuations being equally
"right" insofar as they involve the good-faith exercise of discretion and conscience on the
part of different individual fact finders, i.e., reasonable individual fact finders could adduce
different but reasonable awards for the same injury. However, damages in the accounting
sense lend themselves to only one "right" answer at any given point in time, and as such, can
17

B.

Application of Utah Law to Case at Bar.

In the instant action, the damage amount at issue is clearly amenable to an award of
prejudgment interest in light of the criteria enunciated by the Supreme Court and this Court,
for at least three reasons. First, the case below arose out of a contract. Lefavi invested
monies with Bertoch and Poulson in exchange for their agreement to pay Lefavi a fixed
proportional share of the proceeds received from the sales of the Las Vegas Properties. The
Las Vegas Properties were eventually sold for a fixed sum and Bertoch and Poulson received
in return a quantifiable amount for their interest in the Las Vegas Properties. Thereafter,
Bertoch and Poulson failed to pay Lefavi the monies due and owing him under the contract.
Such amounts became fixed and complete at the particular times when the sales proceeds
were paid to Bertoch and Poulson and thereby became due and owing to Lefavi but were not
paid. This is precisely the type of situation where prejudgment interest is contemplated. See
Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co.. 939 P.2d 1204, 1212 (Utah App. 1997) ("In Utah, prejudgment
interest represents the amount awarded as damages due to the opposing party's delay in
tendering the amount owing under an obligation.")

be said to be ascertained with mathematical certainty. Dispute as to certain operative facts
does not change the reality that the accounting accompanying those facts is still
mathematically accurate. In short, the difference between the two types of damages is the
difference between the exercise of subjective and objective judgment.
18

Second, the damages at issue were arrived at by generally accepted accounting
conventions, and not by any exercise of the trial court's discretion or best judgment. The
court below did not exercise its discretion or judgment in fixing the amount of the award.
It exercised its judgment only in determining the existence of the underlying liability, which
then acted as a self-executing determination as to which stipulated amount of liability should
apply. In other words, the applicability of the various stipulated amounts of liability set forth
in the Stipulation depended on the precedent factual determination of whether certain sums
could be counted as basis, credits, payments, or offsets against ultimate liability. The trial
court found the more persuasive evidence indicated that Bertoch and Poulson's claimed
inflated basis, credits, payments, and offsets would not be permitted, and the higher figure
of ultimate liability proffered by Lefavi (reflecting no such adjustments) was accepted over
the lower figure proffered by Bertoch and Poulson. This was a judgment as to the underlying
ultimate liability, and was not an exercise of discretion by the trial court as to the propriety
of the amount due and owing. In fact, once the trial court made its determination of liability,
it was bound to accept one of the alternate figures already calculated by the parties'
accounting experts.5 The trial court did not come up with its own new figure, but rather
5

It is significant that any real dispute between the parties was regarding the
applicability of certain facts and not competing accounting methodologies. Nowhere do
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accepted and applied one of the contingent figures already determined and stipulated to by
the accounting experts.
Third, the instant action implicates the Supreme Court's concern with preventing
unjust enrichment by deterring defendants from intentionally withholding amounts dues and
owing. Trail Mountain Coal 921 P.2d at 1371. The trial court found that Bertoch and
Poulson received proceeds from the sales of the Las Vegas Properties in 1983, 1985, 1988
and 1991. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 19, 22-23, 27-31, 33, and 35.) Bertoch and Poulson
should have paid Lefavi his share of such proceeds at the time they received such monies.

Bertoch and Poulson suggest that the stipulation figures in Trial Exhibit 140 were arbitrary
or resulted from splitting the difference between the parties' accountants. In fact, the two
sides' accountants were in agreement as to methodology. Bertoch and Poulson's own
accountant testified:
We [the parties' respective accountants] identified seven items that seem to be
disputed facts that affected our damage calculations. Outside of those seven
items, we agreed for the most part to methodology that should be used in
calculating damages in this case.
Record at 1590, pp. 600-01. Though the trial court's acceptance or rejection of any of those
seven facts may have had an correlative effect on the ultimate amount of liability, such a
determination deals with the existence of liability and does not purport to set the amount of
liability. Rather, any amounts of liability as tied to certain fact scenarios had been
determined beforehand by the accountants and their agreed-upon methodology. Any effect
on ultimate liability was due to the application of accepted methodology to the facts as
determined by the trial court, and not as a result of the trial court's exercise of discretion in
regard to the propriety of the amount awarded.
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Instead, Bertoch and Poulson intentionally and fraudulently refused to pay Lefavi any of the
proceeds received and were thereby unjustly enriched by withholding such monies from
Lefavi. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 38-39, 41, 43, 46, and 55-57.) Therefore, it is entirely
appropriate to apply prejudgment interest to the contractual amounts wrongfully and
fraudulently withheld by Bertoch and Poulson from Lefavi.
C.

Factual Issues in the Instant Action Do Not Preclude an Award of
Prejudgment Interest Where Damage Amounts Are Set by Fixed
Standards and with Mathematical Certainty.

Bertoch and Poulson have asserted that because at the trial court level the instant
action was "replete with disputed factual determinations" which the trier-of-fact had to
resolve in order to render a decision, the case therefore fails to qualify for an award of
prejudgment interest. A review of Utah case law addressing the issue of prejudgment interest
establishes the rule that it is not the presence of disputed factual issues which determines
whether or not prejudgment interest will be awarded, but whether a trial court must use its
best judgment in assessing the amount of damages or evaluating elements required to
determine damages which elements lack fixed standards by which to measure their value.
The instant action is exactly the type of case which Utah case law not only permits, but
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requires, prejudgment interest in an attempt to return a prevailing party to the status quo by
fully compensating him for actual loss. James Constructors, 888 P.2d at 671.
During the course of the trial, Bertoch and Poulson raised numerous factual issues to
the trial court as to whether certain payments were made towards their contractual obligation
with Lefavi, whether they were entitled to deduct certain expenses against such obligation,
whether they were entitled to certain offsets against such obligation, and whether the overall
obligation should include some proceeds received from the sale of the Las Vegas Properties
but not other proceeds. Lefavi consistently asserted that all such issues were simply "red
herrings" thrown out by Bertoch and Poulson in an attempt to create factual disputes. As
to each one of Bertoch and Poulson's claims, the trial court specifically found that "[t]here
was insufficient credible or admissible evidence presented during the course of the trial to
support Bertoch and Poulson's claims that the following items relate to and reduce or affect
the proceeds due Lefavi from his investment in the Las Vegas Properties: (a) payments of
commissions to Hansen and Bova; (b) a buyout of DuBois; (c) a buyout of Daines and
Nelson; (d) deduction for additional, general and administrative expenses; (e) a payment to
Lefavi of $32,182.00; (f) amounts paid to Lefavi from stock profits; and (g) amounts paid
to Lefavi on stock transactions." (See Finding of Fact No. 52.)
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In spite of such asserted factual issues, the amount of Lefavi's damages were complete
and calculable with mathematical certainty. In fact, the damages in the instant case were so
clearly calculable with mathematical certainty that the accounting experts from both sides
were able to agree to the specific dollar amount which would be used to determine the
damages based on the trial court's factual findings. Those specific amounts were stipulated
to and admitted into evidence as Trial Exhibit 140. That Stipulation identified, with
mathematical certainty and based on a fixed standard, the following: (1) the total amount of
the proceeds received by Bertoch and Poulson under the factual scenario claimed by Lefavi
and the factual scenario claimed by Bertoch and Poulson; (2) the percentage of participation
of Lefavi under either scenario; (3) the specific amount of payments made by Bertoch and
Poulson, if the trial court determined that there was sufficient factual evidence presented to
the court to render such a finding; and (4) the specific amount of general administrative
damages and expenses which would be factored into the damage calculation, if the court
found sufficient evidence to support such a claim by Bertoch and Poulson. Whether or not
the Stipulation represents a compromised amount between the parties, the basic premise does
not change. The amount of damages were stipulated to because the elements for evaluating
the damages were set by fixed standards by which their value could be measured.
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D.

Faulty Nature of Bertoch and Poulson's Arguments against Availability
of Prejudgment Interest.

Bertoch and Poulson argue that the trial court's ruling on damages involved disputed
issues of fact, and as such, was not susceptible of mathematical accuracy such that
prejudgment interest could be applied as a matter of law. Bertoch and Poulson's arguments
are unavailing and unconvincing on any one of a number of levels.
1.

The Parties' Stipulation Acted as a Waiver to Any Objections to
the Issues Stipulated.

At various points throughout their Brief, Bertoch and Poulson either mischaracterize
or ignore the effect of the Stipulation. They assert that the existence of disputed accounting
issues, either before or in the absence of the Stipulation, operate to guarantee the continuing
existence of disputed accounting issues, mainly by repeatedly making the argument that, but
for the Stipulation, the trial court would have had to determine every accounting dispute as
an issue of fact. They maintain that despite the fact that the Stipulation obviated any need
for the trial court to exercise its judgment as to accounting issues, the court would have had
to do so absent the Stipulation, and that the mere possibility of a hypothetical scenario that
never occurred somehow precludes an award of prejudgment interest. This argument is
misguided.
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By stipulating to disputed accounting issues, Bertoch and Poulson waived any future
claim to treat such issues as disputed.6 See Buzianis v. Beneficial Homes, Inc., 550 P.2d 174
(Utah 1976) (party to stipulation could not attack stipulation as being ambiguous where it
was entered into at his behest and for his benefit); DLB Collection Trust ex rel. Helgesen &
Waterfall v. Harris 893 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah App. 1995) ("stipulations are conclusive and
binding on the parties, unless good cause is shown for relief).

It is axiomatic that any

stipulation acts as a waiver of future challenges to the facts being stipulated. If not, then
stipulations become meaningless and wasteful exercises.
The fact that accounting issues could have been disputed in the absence of a
Stipulation in no way negates the waiver effect of the Stipulation.7 Therefore by entering

6

Bertoch and Poulson even use the language of waiver in their Brief:

To simplify the disputes, as part of the stipulation Bertoch waived the claim
that the amount was higher.
(Aplt. Brief at 26.)
7

Bertoch and Poulson make the bold, if erroneous, argument that the prestipulation disputed nature of facts somehow survives the stipulation:
Even though the agreement between the accountants made it unnecessary for
the Court to rule on the disputed items, the existence of those disputes
precludes the award of prejudgment interest.
25

into a Stipulation, upon which the trial court expressly relied in determining that accounting
figures contained therein were accurate (see Finding of Facts Nos. 35 and 53), Bertoch and
Poulson waived any future objection to those figures being anything other than settled and
mathematically accurate. Bertoch and Poulson should be estopped from advancing any
argument that issues addressed by the Stipulation are disputed and thereby unsusceptible of
mathematical accuracy.
2.

The Stipulation Did Not Preclude an Award for Prejudgment Interest.

Bertoch and Poulson's Brief attempts to argue that a court is required to "use its best
judgment" any time that court has to decide a "material disputed issue." Bertoch and
Poulson's argument is not supported by relevant Utah case law. Such case law specifically
identifies that the critical issues for the determination of prejudgment interest are issues
regarding the determination of the damages or amount of damages, not whether the trier-offact has to exercise its judgment to determine a disputed material fact. Bertoch and Poulson
argue that they are being punished for their willingness to stipulate to certain mathematical,
fixed sums, on which the trial court could rely in its calculation of damages, depending on
how the court decided disputed material issues of fact. Bertoch and Poulson are not being

(Aplt. Brief at 26; emphasized in original.)
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punished when the trial court applies the fixed measures of damages as stipulated and agreed
to by them and their accounting expert. The reason the parties were able to stipulate to such
numbers is because the numbers were clearly mathematically calculable and could be
determined from fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value. The Stipulation
merely eliminated the need for the trial court to hear two accounting experts testifying as to
how they both arrived at basically the same numbers, based on the contract between the
parties and the fixed proceeds received from the sale of the Las Vegas Properties.
Even if the parties had not stipulated to the amounts of damages, each party, through
their respective accounting expert, would have presented to the trial court a calculation of
damages based on fixed standards of value and mathematical certainty. Regardless of how
the trial court would have determined the factual issues, the calculation of the damages
would have been arrived at by the trial court through fixed standards of value. The trial court
would not have exercised its discretion as to the amount of damages to award; it would have
simply followed the calculations of the respective accounting experts. The Stipulation did
not change the character of the basic claims between the parties nor the fact that the damages
attached to those claims could be determined by fixed standards of value. To the contrary,
the Stipulation simply reinforces the recognition that this contract case and the damages
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awarded as a result of it could be calculated with mathematical certainty and based on fixed
standards of value. The Stipulation did not stipulate to material disputed issues of fact.
Those were left for the trial court to determine.
C.

Appellants Argue an Unworkable and Overbroad Standard of
Mathematical Accuracy.

This case is a straightforward case of contractual liability and subsequent fraud. As
such, any claimed amounts of overpayment or underpayment are clearly the type of damages
that Utah courts have contemplated as being ascertainable with mathematical accuracy.
Bertoch and Poulson argue that since the trial court had to exercise judgment as to certain
facts affecting the amount of ultimate liability, then the court had to use its "best judgment,"
any resultant award is not "calculable through a mathematically certain procedure," and
therefore prejudgment interest cannot be awarded. Bertoch and Poulson's argument proposes
an unworkable standard, or, at least, a standard that would forever disallow any award of
prejudgment interest. Every judicial determination of disputed facts requires exercising some
degree of judgment as to those disputed issues of fact. Every case going to trial will have
disputed facts. If rendering judgment as to disputed facts in and of itself renders prejudgment
interest unavailable, as argued by Bertoch and Poulson, then no case going to trial on
disputed facts will ever be susceptible to prejudgment interest. Further, Bertoch and Poulson
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argue that the availability of different accounting methods necessarily entails an exercise of
"discretion" and "best judgment." They are in effect saying that any contract action requiring
an accounting analysis cannot be "mathematically accurate." This reasoning not only turns
the rules allowing prejudgment interest on their head, but it effectively swallows them up,
since, according to Bertoch and Poulson, any exercise ofjudgment as to underlying disputed
facts is enough to call into question the mathematical accuracy of an award.
The flaw in Bertoch and Poulson's reasoning is their failure to distinguish between:
(1) judgments on the existence of underlying liability, and (2) judgments regarding the
amount of liability or the propriety of such amount. As discussed above, judgment can be
made on disputed facts relating to underlying liability without requiring a discretionary "best
judgment" as to the amount of such underlying liability.
Bertoch and Poulson further argue that damages could not have been fixed before the
Stipulation, and that any damages were fixed only at that time and not before. In fact, the
damages awarded by the trial court accrued and were fixed at such times as Lefavi should
have been paid sums contractually owed him, but were not. The exact amount of contractual
proceeds due Lefavi may have been temporarily rendered uncertain due to passage of time
and various claimed offsets, but such uncertainty (almost wholly a product of Bertoch and
Poulson's fraudulent behavior and bogus offset claims) does not negate the fact that such
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proceeds were sufficiently fixed and certain that Bertoch and Poulson reported taxable gains
on such sales in 1983, 1985, 1988 and 1991. (See Findings of FactNos. 23, 29, 31, 33, and
34.)
Bertoch and Poulson's argument paves the way for unscrupulous defendants to create
self-serving uncertainty through nondisclosure and frivolous assertions of set-offs, thereby
avoiding the very sanction of prejudgment interest that Utah courts have provided to address
just such bad-faith behavior.
II.

BERTOCH AND POULSON HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
IN REGARDS TO THE REMAINING ISSUES.
As pointed out above, each of Bertoch and Poulson's remaining three issues on appeal

challenge the factual findings made by the trial court below, whether expressly or implicitly.
As such, Bertoch and Poulson have a two-step burden. First, they must marshal all the
evidence that supports the challenged findings. Second, they must then demonstrate that,
despite the marshaled evidence, the findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the
clear weight of the evidence" and, thus, clearly erroneous. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312.
Bertoch and Poulson have a high standard to meet in marshaling the evidence. "In
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present,
in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
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which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith,
Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis in original,
quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991).
"Once appellants have established every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they
then 'must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence' and show why those pillars fail to support
the trial court's findings." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872
P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994), quoting West Valley, 818P.2dat 1314. An appellant
fails to meet his burden of marshaling where he ignores evidence supportive of the trial
court's findings and selectively marshals only evidence supportive of his position, since to
do so is tantamount to rearguing the merits of his case before the appellate court. Interiors
Contracting, 881 P.2d at 933; Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053. Therefore, when an appellant fails
to adequately marshal the evidence for a reviewing court, that court should "refuse to
consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." Mountain
States Broadcasting v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989).
In each of the three remaining issues raised by Bertoch and Poulson, they fail to meet
their burden of marshaling the evidence, namely: (1) the trial court's putative failure to
correct mathematical error; (2) the trial court's putative misapplication of or deviation from
stipulated facts; and (3) the trial court's putative inconsistency in applying stipulated facts.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE STIPULATED DAMAGE
AMOUNTS GIVEN ITS PRECEDENT DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES
OF FACT.
Bertoch and Poulson argue that after the trial court reached its determination and

ruling regarding certain issues of disputed materials facts, it incorrectly applied the damage
amounts as calculated by the parties' respective accounting experts in the Stipulation.
Bertoch and Poulson misstate the trial court's clear Rulings and Findings of Fact, and attempt
to reargue before this Court their original claims which the trial court rejected for lack of any
admissible or credible evidence. If Bertoch and Poulson desire this Court to overturn the trial
court's Findings of Fact, then they must establish that such findings are against the clear
weight of the evidence, are clearly erroneous, and thereby constitute an abuse of the trial
court's discretion.
When the Stipulation was presented to the trial court, Bertoch and Poulson's
accounting expert and counsel, and Lefavi's counsel went to great lengths to explain how the
trial court could use the Stipulation to assist the court in its determination of damages. (See
Record at 1590, pp. 600-14.) Both parties acknowledged that the actual damages, if any,
were totally reliant upon the trial court first determining various issues of fact. Once those
issues of fact were determined, the application of the alternate measures of damages would
be fairly straightforward. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court issued its ruling from
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the bench, finding in favor of Lefavi and ruling that Bertoch and Poulson had failed to meet
their burden of proof in establishing to the court's satisfaction that they had in fact bought
out three prior partners in the Las Vegas Properties, or that they had paid any commissions
in connection with the Las Vegas Properties. These findings were reemphasized in the trial
court's written Court's Ruling of December 22, 1997 and Amended/Corrected Court's
Ruling of January 5, 1998. (See Record at 1347-53, and the Amended/Corrected Court's
Ruling, which is attached as part of to this Addendum because it does not appear in the
Record.) For the Court's convenience, copies of the trial court's rulings dated December 22,
1997, January 5,1998, and March 25,1998 are attached as exhibits to this Briefs Addendum
as Exhibits "1," "2" and "3."
After the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were drafted and submitted to the
trial court, Bertoch and Poulson had another opportunity to persuade the trial court that it
erred in its initial ruling. Bertoch and Poulson submitted to the trial court lengthy objections
to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (See Record at 1354-1436.) In
response to such objections, the trial court issued another ruling dated March 25, 1998,
wherein it again stated that the evidence Bertoch and Poulson proffered in support of their
various claims was unpersuasive and failed to meet the required burden of proof. (See
Record at 1471-77.)
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Based on its findings, the trial court did not incorrectly apply the Stipulation. The trial
court applied the Stipulation completely consistent with its factual findings. Bertoch and
Poulson's real grievance is that the trial court rejected every one of their bogus, "red-herring"
claims. On appeal, Bertoch and Poulson simply persist in arguing that the trial court was
mistaken in certain of its factual and evidentiary rulings. By arguing misapplication of the
Stipulation, Bertoch and Poulson hope to provide themselves cover for two otherwise
unacceptable appellate advocacy strategies, namely, failing to marshal the evidence and
rearguing the merits of their case.
If this Court carefully reviews the Stipulation in light of the trial court's rulings and
Findings of Fact, it will recognize that the trial court's determination of damages taken from
the calculations in the Stipulation are entirely consistent with its Findings. For example, the
trial court found that there was not adequate evidence to support Bertoch and Poulson's
claims of commissions to Hansen and Bova or a buyout of three other partners. Thus the
court disregarded Lines (16) through (19) of page one of the Stipulation, and determined
Lefavi's proportional share of the Las Vegas Properties to be 5.27%, as specified on Line
(20) of page one of the Stipulation. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 35, 51 and 52; the
Stipulation; and the Court's Rulings on the Record at 1347-53, 1471-77, and Exhibit "2"
attached to this Briefs Addendum.) The trial court also found the evidence proffered by
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Bertoch and Poulson in support of their claims of (1) general and administrative expenses,
(2) payment of $32,182, and (3) amounts paid to Lefavi from stock transactions to be
insufficient to carry their burden of proof. (See Findings of Fact, Nos. 51 and 52; the Court's
Rulings on the Record at 1347-53, 1471-77, and Exhibit "2" attached to this Briefs
Addendum.) Consistent with its rulings and findings, the trial court stated that it would not
reduce the damage award by the items identified in Lines (14) through (17) of page two of
the Stipulation. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 51 and 52; the Stipulation; and the Court's
Rulings on the Record at 1347-53, 1471-77, and Exhibit "2" attached to this Briefs
Addendum.)
The trial court did not err in applying the stipulated amounts of the Stipulation. The
damage calculation determined from the Stipulation was consistent with the trial court's
rulings and Findings of Fact.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT BERTOCH AND POULSON'S CLAIMS TO REDUCE LEFAVI'S
PROPORTIONAL SHARE, AND AWARDED DAMAGES CONSISTENT
WITH ITS RULING.
Bertoch and Poulson attempt to argue that the trial court applied the Stipulation

inconsistent with its "legal rulings." The Stipulation was given to the trial court to guide it
in determining damages after the court had determined precedent factual issues, not legal
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issues. When counsel for Bertoch and Poulson presented the Stipulation to the trial court,
he asked his accounting expert regarding its use: "Now, after the Court rules on the disputed
items, that is whether or not payments to Hansen and Bova were appropriate, payments to
DuBois were appropriate, the buy-out of Daines and Nelson were appropriate items to be
considered as part of Bertoch's investment in the Las Vegas project and determines the other
items in 14 through 17 [of page two of the Stipulation], could you make a quick calculation
as to an amount [of damages]?" His expert replied:" Yes, we could." (See Record at 1590,
p. 611.) Bertoch and Poulson acknowledged that the disputed items requiring the trial court's
ruling prior to determining damagesfromthe Stipulation were factual issues, not legal issues.
Therefore, in order for this Court to overrule such determinations, it must apply the "clearly
erroneous" standard, not the "correction of an error" standard as argued by Bertoch and
Poulson.
In weighing the evidence presented to it regarding Bertoch and Poulson's claims that
they bought out three other partners and paid commissions, the trial court ruled there was
insufficient credible or admissible evidence presented to support such claims. (See Finding
of Fact Nos. 51 & 52.) Based on these findings, the trial court correctly refused to adjust
Bertoch and Poulson contribution to the Las Vegas Properties by these unproved amounts
when determining Lefavi's proportional share of the Las Vegas Properties investment. The
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trial court did not give Lefavi credit as if he were a participant in the buyout; it simply found
that no such claimed buyout ever occurred because Bertoch and Poulson failed to marshal
the evidence sufficient to prove such a claim. (See Findings of Fact, Nos. 51 and 52; the
Court's Rulings on the Record at 1347-53,1471-77, and Exhibit "2" attached to this Briefs
Addendum.)
V.

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT REGARDING BERTOCH AND
POULSON'S CLAIMS WAS DISPUTED AND THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY APPLIED THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES BASED ON ITS
FINDINGS.
A.

The Trial Court Found Any Proffered Evidence of Third-party
Buyouts and Commissions to Be Unpersuasive and Lacking
Credibility.

Bertoch and Poulson argue that they presented undisputed testimony and evidence
which the trial court ignored regarding Bertoch and Poulson buying out three other partners
for $563,500 and paying commissions of $101,519. The trial court did not ignore or
overlook the testimony and evidence Bertoch and Poulson presented regarding these claims.
Rather, the trial court considered such evidence and found it unpersuasive and lacking
credibility. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 51 and 52.)
Bertoch and Poulson's claims that there were three other partners in their original 50%
investment in the Las Vegas Properties was disputed by Lefavi with evidence presented to
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the trial court. Lefavi testified that in all his dealings with Bertoch and Poulson he had never
been made aware of the three prior partners until the present litigation began. (See Record
at 1587, p. 52.) From deposition testimony read into the record during the trial, Dudley
Smith of DASCO, the other 50% owner of the Las Vegas Properties, stated that the only
individuals he was aware of that held an interest in Richard Street Development Company
of Nevada was Bertoch and Poulson. (See Record at 1588, pp. 291-93 ). Richards Street
Development Company of Nevada was the entity Bertoch and Poulson used to hold their
interest in the Las Vegas Properties from approximately February 1976 to 1982. (See
Findings of Fact Nos. 3 and 4.)
During his testimony to the trial court, Bertoch testified that he and Poulson were the
only persons in Richard Street Development Company who put any money toward the Las
Vegas Properties. (See Record at 1588 , p. 209.) Bertoch also testified that he and Poulson
acquired their initial interest in the Las Vegas Properties in the middle of 1975. By February
1976, a title report which was admitted into evidence as Trial Exhibit 41, indicated that
Bertoch and Poulson were the only partners in Richards Street Development Company of
Nevada.
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During his testimony, Bertoch claimed that when he bought out the interests of the
other three partners in the Las Vegas Properties sometime in late 1975, he gave up all of his
interests in the partnership known as Richards Street Development Company of Utah.
Bertoch claimed that giving up such interests constituted the $400,000.00 of consideration
paid by Bertoch and Poulson to two of the partners, Daines and Nelson, for their interests in
the Las Vegas Properties. (See Record at 15 88, pp. 241-42,254.) However, 1981 tax returns
for both Bertoch and Poulson, which were admitted into evidence, reported a substantial gain
for both of them from the sale of property held by Richards Street Development Company
of Utah.

(See Record at 1588, p. 279; and at 1589, p. 375.) In addition, Bertoch's tax

returns from 1978, 1979, and 1980 also listed gains or losses from his interest in Richards
Street Development Company of Utah. (See Record at 1589, pp. 374-75.) Bertoch's tax
returns and Poulson's tax returns directly contradicted Bertoch's testimony to the trial court
regarding the purported buyout of Daines and Nelson with an in-kind exchange valued at
$400,000.
The checks Bertoch produced as evidence as the support for his claim to have paid the
third partner, DuBois, for his interest in the Las Vegas Properties and purportedly for
commissions to Hansen and Bova for the Las Vegas Properties were found by the trial court
to be unreliable and inadmissible. (See Record at 1589, pp. 461-81.) Many of the checks
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were written out to parties other than the parties Bertoch claimed received or should be
credited for the payment. Some checks had handwritten memos on their face, written by
Bertoch contemporaneously with the writing of the check, which memos indicated that the
checks were for purposes different than the purposes Bertoch was claiming during the trial.
(See Record at 1589, pp. 462-81.) Finally, Bertoch's claim that he paid out or gave up in
like value $563,500 to three alleged partners who had only been part of the Las Vegas
Properties for a few months and who failed to pay any money toward the Las Vegas
Properties was disputed by Lefavi's accounting expert, Gert Foerster. After researching
Bertoch's tax returns and records for any supporting evidence of Bertoch's claims, Foerster
testified that such claims by Bertoch were unsupported by Bertoch's records made
contemporaneously with the claimed transactions. (See Record at 1589, pp. 372-78.)
After the trial court fully weighed all of the testimony and evidence presented
regarding this matter, the trial court ruled that Bertoch and Poulson had failed to submit the
evidence necessary to support their claims of a buyout and commissions paid, and
specifically held that: "There was insufficient credible or admissible evidence presented
during the course of the trial which would support Bertoch and Poulson's claims [of] . . .
payments of commissions to Hansen and Bova;... a buy out of DuBois; [and]... a buyout
of Daines and Nelson [the three partners]." (See Findings of Fact, Nos. 51 and 52; the
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Court's Rulings on the Record at 1347-53, and Exhibit "2" attached to this Briefs
Addendum.)
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Find that Payments to Lefavi from Stock
Transactions Should be Credited to Liability for the Las Vegas
Properties.

Bertoch and Poulson further claim that the trial court failed to correctly apply the
terms of the Stipulation to the measure of damages because the trial court did not agree with
Bertoch and Poulson's contention that payments made to Lefavi in 1983 and 1984 from stock
sales were intended to be applied toward their obligations owed to Lefavi from his
investment in the Las Vegas Properties.
First, it should be clarified for this Court that the parties' willingness to stipulate in
the Stipulation to certain fixed dollar amounts for Bertoch and Poulson's claims of payments
to Lefavi from stock sales must not be interpreted or understood to mean that Lefavi
stipulated that such payments were in fact intended or given as a payment, credit or offset
against the obligations owed to Lefavi from his Las Vegas Properties investment. When the
parties presented the Stipulation to the trial court, both sets of counsel and Bertoch and
Poulson's accounting expert went to great lengths to explain to the trial court that the parties
were not conceding or stipulating to any of the factual disputes still to be resolved by the trial
court. (See Record at 1590, pp. 600-14) Through the Stipulation, the parties were only
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attempting to assist the trial court in fixing the calculation of the damages after it had
weighed the evidence and determined which of the factual allegations were sufficiently
established to meet the required burden of proof. Such factual allegations to be determined
by the trial court included: (1) Lefavi's proportional share of the Las Vegas Properties held
by Bertoch and Poulson; (2) which, if any, expenses would be included; (3) which, if any,
payments from the stock sales would be credited against the obligation; and (4) whether the
payment of $32,182 given to Lefavi was from the Las Vegas Properties. The Stipulation did
not concede any of these issues. (See Record at 1590, pp. 611-14.) It only established the
dollar amount the trial court would factor in, after it weighed the evidence and made its
determination as the trier-of-fact as to which items would be included in the damage
calculation.
Bertoch and Poulson's claims of payments to Lefavi from stock sales as an offset
against their obligation to him for his Las Vegas Properties investment was strongly disputed
by Lefavi. Although Lefavi invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify as to the
specifics of the stock transactions, there was a great weight of evidence presented to the trial
court which contradicted Bertoch and Poulson's claims. For example, Bertoch's strongest
evidence supporting his claim that the $32,182 payment came from the Las Vegas Properties
and that subsequent stock sales were intended as a credit to Lefavi for the Las Vegas
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Properties was Trial Exhibit 251. Trial Exhibit 251 was produced by Bertoch and admitted
into evidence. It is a memorandum written in Bertoch's handwriting, purportedly prepared
and given to Lefavi on August 15,1983, the same day as the check for $32,182 was prepared
and delivered to Lefavi.

(See Record at 1589, pp. 481-82; and at 1590, pp. 497-98.)

During the trial, Lefavi testified he received no monies from Bertoch or Poulson at
any time for his investment in the Las Vegas Properties, and particularly not at the time of
the 1983 sale. (See Record at 1587, pp. 74,172.) Lefavi also testified that he had never seen
Trial Exhibit 251 until the litigation was filed. (See Record at 1590, p. 656.) A handwriting
expert called by Lefavi testified to the trial court that after examining Trial Exhibit 251 and
writing samples from Bertoch given over the period of time from 1978 through 1992, in his
expert opinion Trial Exhibit 251 was prepared by Bertoch sometime after 1991 or 1992, and
was backdated to appear to have been written at the same time as the check. (See Record at
1590, pp. 639-45.) For the Court's convenience, copies of Trial Exhibit 251 and the $32,182
check. Trial Exhibit 252, are attached as exhibits to this Briefs Addendum as Exhibits "4"
and "5." In addition to the evidence presented to the trial court, a simple visual comparison
of the two documents supports the trial court's finding that the evidence presented to the
court by Bertoch regarding such a payment and arrangement on the stock sales lacked
sufficient credible or admissible evidence. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 51 and 52.) Bertoch
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and Poulson failed to produce an expert witness who could refute Lefavi's handwriting
expert's opinion. Trial Exhibit 251 was also in direct contradiction to two handwritten pages
prepared by Bertoch at or about the time of the $32,182 payment and stock payments to
Lefavi. Trial Exhibit 17 admitted into evidence is a two-page summary written by Bertoch
in 1983 listing stock transactions between Bertoch and Lefavi. The document includes the
$32,182 payment as one of the stock payments and makes no reference or otherwise indicates
that any of the referenced stock payments have any relationship to the Las Vegas Properties.
(See Trial Exhibit 17 and Record at 1590, pp. 575-77.)
In late 1991, when Bertoch first disclosed to Lefavi that all the properties associated
with the Las Vegas Properties had been sold, Bertoch drafted two documents identifying
what Lefavi had received in return for his investment in the Las Vegas Properties. One of
the documents was prepared by Bertoch for Lefavi to use in reporting the liquidation of his
Las Vegas Properties investment on his tax returns. (See Trial Exhibit 23.) Both documents,
Trial Exhibits 20 and 23, stated that the only consideration Lefavi had received for his entire
Las Vegas Properties investment was some shares of restricted stock in Las Vegas Resorts,
Inc., which Bertoch had delivered to Lefavi on September 19, 1991. Bertoch failed to list
in either document any prior cash payments or credits for stock overpayments. (See Record
at 1587, pp. 82-85.)
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After the trial court fully weighed all of the testimony and evidence presented
regarding the alleged payments and stock transactions, the trial court ruled that Bertoch and
Poulson had failed to marshal the evidence necessary to support their claims of a $32,182
payment or payments from stock transactions applying to the Las Vegas Properties obligation
to Lefavi, and specifically the court held that n[t]here was insufficient credible or admissible
evidence presented during the course of the trial which would support Bertoch and Poulson's
claims [ o f ] . . . a payment to Lefavi of $32,182.00;.. . amounts paid to Lefavi from stock
profits; and .. . amounts paid to Lefavi on stock transactions." (See Findings of Fact Nos.
51 and 52.)
Bertoch and Poulson claim the trial court ignored undisputed evidence, both at trial
and in a subsequent written memorandum to the trial court by Bertoch and Poulson when the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were being prepared and reviewed. Bertoch and
Poulson misrepresent the evidence to this Court. Their claims were disputed and their
evidence was found insufficient. If Bertoch and Poulson are to convince this Court to
overturn the lower court's analysis of the evidence and determination of the factual issues,
then Bertoch and Poulson must marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial court's
findings and then establish that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous and against the
great weight of the evidence presented to the trial court. Bertoch and Poulson have clearly
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failed to meet their burden before this Court, and the Court should affirm the lower court's
findings and measure of damages.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly awarded prejudgment interest in this action. Lefavi's claims
and damage determination met the criteria set forth in applicable Utah case law. The
damages were based on a contract, fixed at a particular time and were calculated with
mathematical accuracy with fixed standards of value. Prejudgment interest was awarded to
Lefavi in an attempt to return him to the status quo by fully compensating him for his actual
loss and deterring Bertoch and Poulson from intentionally withholding amounts due Lefavi,
thereby preventing unjust enrichment.
The trial court carefully weighed all of the evidence presented regarding the factual
disputes of Bertoch and Poulson's alleged payments, credits, offsets and additional basis.
The Court specifically found Bertoch and Poulson's evidence insufficiently credible or
admissible. In this appeal, Bertoch and Poulson reargue the merits of their case, but fail to
marshal all of the evidence or to establish that the lower court abused its discretion as the
finder of fact or that its findings are clearly erroneous and against the great weight of the
evidence presented.
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In this appeal, Bertoch and Poulson have failed in their burden sufficient to overturn
the lower court's rulings, findings and conclusions of law. Therefore, this Court should
conclude that the lower court's award of prejudgment interest was correct, that the lower
court did not abuse its discretion in its findings, rulings and damage calculations, and that the
lower court's actions should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this J^_ day of April, 1999.
KESLER & RUST
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EXHIBIT "1"

FILED !8Sn»CTGaURT
Third Judicial District

DEC 2 2 1997
SALT LAjfc/COUNTY
By-

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE A . LEFAVI, an

individual,

Plaintiff,

COURT'S RULING
CASE NO.

920906147

vs.

RICHARD K. BERTOCH, an
individual, and WILLIAM E.
POULSON, an individual,
Defendants.

This case came before the Court for trial beginning on August
25, 1997, and continuing through August 29, 1997. The Court having
received testimony and heard argument from counsel, ruled from the
bench that the plaintiff entered into a valid and binding contract
with the defendants. The Court further found that defendants made
various misrepresentations to the plaintiff which constituted
fraud.

In finding that fraud existed, the Court ruled that the

statute of limitations would not act as a bar to the plaintiff's
action against the defendants. The matter of whether the plaintiff
is entitled to prejudgment interest and the amount of damages was
taken under advisement by the Court.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Through t e s t i m o n y
plaintiff

elicited

agreed

partnership

on a p r o p o r t i o n a l

plaintiff's

to

have

contribution

towards

Pursuant

trial,

the Court

found

that

entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e defendants whereby

defendants

money

at

an

to this

the

plaintiff

share

participate

basis

in

exchange

the

in
for

a
the

( o r i g i n a l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a " l o a n " )

interest
contract,

in

certain

Las

the plaintiff

Vegas

contributed

of

properties.
a total

of

$68,875.00.
Various
testimony

financial

and

information

offered

exhibits,

adduced

suggests

c o m m i t t e d f r a u d by s e l l i n g p o r t i o n s

and t h a t

the p r o p e r t i e s

p a r t i e s . The p l a i n t i f f

that

trial,
the

through
defendants

o f t h e Las Vegas p r o p e r t i e s ,

but misrepresenting to the p l a i n t i f f
occurring

at

t h a t no s a l e s were i n

were

still

being held by

t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e l e a r n e d of t h e t h r e e

o f t h e Las Vegas p r o p e r t i e s d u r i n g a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Mr.
Smith,

the

According

Nevada-based
to

documentation

the

partner

plaintiff's

regarding

the

in

the

testimony,

defendants'

fact

Las Vegas
Mr.

Smith

receipt

of

the
sales

Dudley

properties.
sent

him

substantial

s a l e s p r o c e e d s r e c e i v e d from t h e s a l e of t h e Las Vegas p r o p e r t i e s .
B a s e d on t h i s t e s t i m o n y and s u b s t a n t i a t i n g d o c u m e n t a t i o n i n

the
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form of the defendants' tax returns from previous years, the Court
ruled that liability was clear on the part of both defendants,
equally as partners.
ISSUES
The first of the remaining issues before the Court, is whether
the criteria in Utah case law for allowing prejudgment interest has
been met in this case. The next issue is whether the prejudgment
interest should accrue at six percent per annum, the rate in effect
on the dates that the two contracts between the parties were
entered into, or the present rate of ten percent annum.
issue is whether the defendants

are entitled

The final

to offsets or

reductions against the damages amount.
LESAX, ftflALYSIS
In their Memorandum regarding prejudgment interest, defendants
argue that there are numerous disputed factual issues precluding
this Court from granting prejudgment interest.

The defendants'

recitation of Utah case law on this subject correctly points out
that prejudgment interest may only be awarded "where "damage is
complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the
amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time.'" Castillo v.
Atlanta Casualty Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1212 (Utah App. 1997).

The
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Castillo court references Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848
P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993), wherein the court more fully explained
the circumstances warranting prejudgment interest:
In Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in
situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be
measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is
fixed as of a particular time.
Bjork v. April
Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert
denied,
431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245
(1977) . Although damages may be unliquidated, they must
be calculable through a mathematically certain procedure
allowing the court or the jury to fix the amount by
following "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value... rather than be[ing] guided by their best judgment
in assessing the amount" or evaluating elements lacking
fixed standards by which to measure their value. Fell,
88 P. at 1007; Price-Orem v. Rollings, Brown & Gunnell,
784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah App. 1989).
If sufficient
certainty exists, courts should allow interest from the
time when damages became fixed, rather than from the date
of the judgment. Bjork, 560 P.2d at 317. However,
"where ^damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within
the province of the jury to assess
at the time of
trial,'" then prejudgment interest is inappropriate.
Price-Orem, 784 P.2d at 483 (quoting Fell, 88 P. At
1006) .
Id. at 177.
The p l a i n t i f f

suggests t h a t t h e Damage Calculation Summary,

admitted

as

Exhibit

140,

prepared

j o i n t l y by the

represents
parties'

calculations

accounting

which

experts

were

and were

s t i p u l a t e d to by the p a r t i e s and which a r r i v e at mathematically
c e r t a i n damages.

The Court a g r e e s t h a t the damages in t h i s case
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can indeed be measured by the facts and figures agreed to by the
parties in Exhibit 140. The Court therefore rules that plaintiff's
right to compensatory damages includes prejudgment interest as a
matter of law because the parties' stipulation of the figures
contained

in Exhibit

140

creates

the necessary mathematical

certainty authorizing the Court to allow prejudgment interest.
Next, the Court agrees with defendants' position that because
the contracts between the parties in this case were entered into
prior to 1981, as evidenced by Exhibits 6 and 9, Utah Code
Annotated §15-1-1(3)l dictates that prejudgment interest should
accrue at 6% per annum, not 10%2.

See Breur-Harrison, Inc. v.

Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 731 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court erred in
applying ten percent interest rate where the contract was executed
prior to 1981) . Since the plaintiff has provided the Court with no
arguments to the contrary, the Court determines that the

1

Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1(2) provides that %N[u]nless parties
to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for a loan... shall be 10% per annum."
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1(3) provides that "[n]othing in this
section may be construed in any way to effect any penalty or
interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes
or to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981."
2

The defendants point out that the statutory rate at the
time the contracts were executed was at 6%. Utah Code Ann.,
Section 15-1-1 (1983).
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prejudgment interest should accrue at 6% under the then-applicable
statute.
With respect to the final issue of adjustments and corrections
to $159,717 in damages, the Court finds that there was insufficient
credible or admissible evidence presented during the course of the
trial which would support the adjustments listed on lines 11
through 13 of Exhibit 140. Since the defendants have not marshaled
the necessary evidence to meet their burden of proof as to these
adjustments, the Court determines that the principal unpaid balance
due to the plaintiff for his interest in the Las Vegas properties
amounts to $159,717.
Plaintiff is to prepare an Order and Findings consistent
with, but not limited to the content of this Ruling within fifteen
(15) days.
Dated this Q-9

day of December, 1997.

LESLIE'A. LEWIS
DISTR-ICT COURT JUDGE

EXHIBIT "2'

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Ji'o'ic'»' Dstrict

JAN

5 1998

S*L7 L A k l CQut

Y

%

By.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C>9rk
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE A. LEFAVI, an individual,

Plaintiff,

AMENDED/CORRECTED
COURT'S RULING
CASE NO.

920906147

vs,
RICHARD K. BERTOCH, an
individual, and WILLIAM E .
POULSON, an individual,
Defendants.

Having carefully reviewed its own December 22, 1997, Ruling,
this Court notes that a minor clarification is in order.

In its

Ruling, this Court determined that there was insufficient credible
or admissible evidence presented during the course of the trial
which would support the adjustments sought by the defendants as
listed on lines 11 through 13 of Exhibit 140. The Court now adds
that the defendants have similarly not marshaled the necessary
evidence as to lines 14 through 17 to meet their burden of proof as
to these adjustments. Accordingly, the Order and Findings to be
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prepared by the plaintiff should reflect the contents of this
Amended/Corrected Ruling.
Pursuant to request, the Court grants the plaintiff until
January 20, 1998, to submit a Revised Final Order and Findings.
J*~

Dated this .5

(fir

day of December, 19b>/.'

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Amended/Corrected Court's Ruling, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

S

day of December, L&&3:

Douglas E. Griffith
Attorney for Plaintiff
36 S. State, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Defendant
2870 s. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
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By-

CeputyCUx

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE A .

LEFAVI, an i n d i v i d u a l ,

:

COURT'S RULING

CASE NO.

Plaintiff,

920906147

vs.

RICHARD K. BERTOCH, an
individual, and WILLIAM E,
POULSON, an individual,
Defendants.

The Court has before it Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's
1/9/98 Revised Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
("Objections").

In their recent Reply to Defendant's 2/25/98

Response to Defendants' Objections to the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ("Reply") , defendants seek oral argument on
their Objection. The Court has reviewed the materials submitted in
support of the Objection, the plaintiff's Response thereto and the
defendants' Reply, noted the two letters articulating the parties'
positions as to when prejudgment interest would commence, reviewed
a transcript of the Court's previous ruling and portions of the
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advised,

determines t h a t

oral

a r g u m e n t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o d e a l w i t h t h e O b j e c t i o n s a s s e r t e d by
t h e d e f e n d a n t and r u l e s a s i n d i c a t e d

herein.

A r e v i e w of t h e P r o p o s e d F i n d i n g s of F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s
Law

("Findings")

s u b m i t t e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f

on F e b r u a r y 3 ,

of

1998,

i n d i c a t e s t h a t w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f a few l i m i t e d a r e a s w h i c h may
be

improved by a d d i t i o n a l

language,

c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s C o u r t ' s p r i o r
Most of t h e d e f e n d a n t s '
of

the

Court's

decision,

Findings

of

Fact

and

rather

completely

Rulings.

than

to the

correctness

findings

of

was

insufficient

p r e s e n t e d during, the c o u r s e of

defendants p e r s i s t

in

and c o n c l u s i o n s

and n o t

re-

For i n s t a n c e ,

credible

or

admissible

evidence

t h e t r i a l which would s u p p o r t

arguing

that

I t appears

(particularly

in

determined

the

However,

the Court i s m i s t a k e n

c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of i t s a s s e s s m e n t of t h e f a c t s and t h e l a w i n
case.

Order
the

a d j u s t m e n t s l i s t e d on l i n e s 11 t h r o u g h 17- of E x h i b i t 1 4 0 .
the

the

address

t h e i r Reply, t h e d e f e n d a n t s r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e Court h a s
there

of

Law s h o u l d

a r g u e t h e m e r i t s of t h e C o u r t ' s p r e v i o u s r u l i n g s .

that

merits

An O b j e c t i o n t o a p r o p o s e d

Conclusions

a c c u r a c y of t h e i n d i v i d u a l

are

O b j e c t i o n s go d i r e c t l y t o t h e

O r d e r p r e p a r e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f .
or

the Findings

from t h e c o n t e x t of t h e

in
this

Reply),
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that the defendants are moving the Court to reconsider its prior
rulings.

Obviously, the defendants have appellate remedies wherein

they may seek a complete review of this Court's decisions.

It is

not appropriate to raise these issues in the context of Objections.
The

Objections are overruled

with

the exception of the

following designated changes, which are to be made in the final
form of the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law.

All

typographical errors found throughout the proposed form of the
Findings, are to be corrected.

At the end of paragraph 5 of the

Findings, the plaintiff is to insert the following sentence:
"Parcel 10 was being purchased on a contract, and the other parcels
were leases and options to purchase."

Also, in paragraph 5, the

plaintiff is to insert the word "which" as follows:

"The Las

Vegas Properties, which consisted of essentially three parcels."
Additionally, plaintiff is to alter paragraph 21 to reflect
that Scott Poulsen was "a Certified Public Accountant who is also
£he son of defendant, Poulsen".

Plaintiff is to change paragraph

23 to reflect that the amount of the check was for $415,257.92
instead of $415,000.

The plaintiff is to amend paragraph 24 to

read: "Subsequent to the 1983 sale, funding of the Las Vegas
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Project was through bank loans which were guaranteed by Bertoch and
Poulson. As a result neither . . . "
Paragraph 25 should be altered to read:

"From the 1983 sale

through 1988, certain portions of the Las Vegas Properties were
leased, and generated income which was used to pay joint venture
expenses ." Paragraph 43 should be altered to read: "At the request
of Lefavi to support the income tax reporting of Lefavi's interest
in the Las Vegas Properties, on December 15, 1991,. . ." Plaintiff
is

to delete paragraphs

51 and

52 in their entirety.

The

defendants' Objection with respect to the $159,717.00 to be awarded
to the plaintiff is not well-taken and is based on the defendants'
arguments that the Court was incorrect in its underlying decision
to exclude the adjustments listed in Exhibit 140. This Court will
not

revisit

its prior

rulings,

for

the reasons

articulated

hereinabove. Accordingly, the defendants' remaining Objections are
denied.
Next, the parties have

asked this Court to clarify its

December 22, 1997 Ruling, wherein in the Court concluded that the
plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest at 6% per annum, but
did not specify when the prejudgment interest would commence.
After reviewing the letters submitted to the Court by both the
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defendants' and plaintiff's counsel, the Court determines that
prejudgment

interest

should

commence

on

the

date

that

the

defendants received their proceeds from the sales of the Las Vegas
Properties.

Defendants' argument that the prejudgment interest

should commence from the date that the parties stipulated to the
calculations contained in Exhibit 140 is not persuasive.

In

arriving at the figures contained in Exhibit 140, the accounting
experts particularly relied on the defendants' tax returns from
1983 to 1991 and on the various financial information derived from
the sale of the Las Vegas Properties.

The figures contained in

Exhibit 140 necessarily relate back to this period of time to
establish what the plaintiff's share of the proceeds would have
been.

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Trail Mountain Coal

CQ T V T Utah pivT of state Lands and Forestry, 921 p.2d 1365, 1371
(Utah 1996), prejudgment interest "compensates a party for the
depreciating value or opportunity cost of amounts owed him, and
deters parties from intentionally withholding amounts due and
owing."

Under Trail Mountain, the plaintiff is entitled to be

compensated for the opportunity cost and depreciating value of the
proceeds which the defendants realized on the sale of the Las Vegas
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and which t h e

plaintiff

would have r e a l i z e d

had

the

d e f e n d a n t s n o t i n t e n t i o n a l l y w i t h h e l d t h e amounts due and owing t o
him.

Accordingly, the Court f i n d s

that

prejudgment

defendants
Vegas

interest

received the

for the p l a i n t i f f ,

should

sales

commence

proceeds

at

determining

the

from t h e s a l e

time
of

the

the
Las

Properties.
No formal

Ruling

re:

Order w i l l

Objections.

be

Rather,

F i n d i n g s t o comport w i t h t h e s e
Dated t h i s Q j

necessary
the

in

connection

plaintiff

is

to

with

this

revise

the

modifications.

day of March,

1998.

LESLIE A. i&WIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify t h a t I mailed a t r u e and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following,
_^

day of March,, 'l998

Douglas E. Griffith
Attorney for Plaintiff
36 s". State, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Defendant
2870 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
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MEMO from R.K. Bertoch
lb:

Bruce Lefavi

Date: Aug. 15, 1983

Subject: L.V. Hotel - Lot #10 Sale (Sellan)

I am attaching with this note a check for $32,182.00 which represents your share of the sale
of the Airport Property (Lot #10) and any Hotel rights and plans which we possessed. This
amount is in accordance with the accounting that was previously given to you by Scott Poulscn
(Scott did not have all of RKB's costs) . I realize that this amount of $32,182.00 does not
return all of your original investment but as we have previously agreed I will work with you
on the sale of the Software Sec. Stock. All of the profit can apply against your shortfall,
after that is cashed we will share 50-50.
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In a meeting with Bruce Lefavi during January of 1991, Bruce stated that
the $32,182 payment was for money that William Poulson owed to him. See page 2
of this document, which is a copy of a check for an amount of $35,379.50 given
to Bruce Lefavi by William Poulson, which refutes Mr. Lefavi's inference.
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